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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: "The NSC Problem" - Interview with Dr. Kaufman

The NSC Problem

Emphasis on: (a) Brevity - 1 to 2 pages always

(b) Aggregative judgements - rather than supporting details

Tradition has been more on the details--i.e., building blocks. Helms briefings to NSC more on pictures of missile silos or numbers of Soviet Divisions on China border. NSC needs judgement--what does it mean? Is USSR actually preparing for war? Preemptive attack? Actually fears Chinese invasion? Playing psychological/political game? How much does this game cost them in terms of the finite resources available? The more it constricts them in resources valuably used elsewhere, the more important or pressing is the decision to expend them opposite China. It is not sufficient to say USSR fears China--how does it fear them? Do they anticipate a military incursion? A large civilian spillover, lemming like, for simple living space? A combination?

How and where do the "NSC problems" get inputted into the analyst? The collector?

Kaufman sees the answer as developing a way of thinking in the Intelligence Officer. D/O is included from viewpoint of collection requirements. D/I obvious. If we start with the EODer, then from the first training course to the last in the general core of training courses this type of thinking should be introduced, developed, and emphasized. Kaufman considers it almost impossible to generalize the concept. Instead, OTR should use specific examples.

Actually this should prove to be the simplest way of teaching. With this in mind OTR should be developing a series of examples, i.e., cases. We could use the past but, perhaps even more relevant, start developing cases from the <u>DCI's current NSC briefings</u>. He has already done one on SALT II and Brandwein could be tapped as a consultant on working up of the cases. DCI is currently working on the next, the

NATO-Warsaw Pact net assessment, as the primary building block for the development of U.S. policy on MBFR (mutual and balanced force reductions). OSR could be consultant on this. As these briefings continue we will have a growing body of genuine case studies.

OTR should start now to prepare for varying injections of the "NSC problem" into the CORE courses and the specific existing courses as appropriate.

STATINTL